Introduction
Over the last three decades, an extensive body of research has examined the impact of diversification on firm performance. Building on theoretical perspectives such as the resource-based view (RBV) and transaction cost economics (TCE), this literature has argued that related diversification provides benefits in the form of economies of scope (Teece 1982) , whereas unrelated diversification confers weak scope economies and is costly due to greater learning. Consistent with these arguments, empirical evidence has demonstrated that unrelatedness has a negative impact on firm performance (Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989 , Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991 , Palich et al. 2000 .
But although this literature has contributed valuable insights, it does not explore in depth the costs of related diversification; rather, it mainly emphasizes its benefits. For example, RBV suggests that diversified firms stop expanding at the point where "excess" productive services have been utilized and managerial diseconomies have begun to set in (Penrose 1959) . However, it does not discuss the mechanisms by which diseconomies may arise within related diversified as opposed to unrelated diversified firms. Similarly, TCE argues that a diversified firm experiences bureaucratic costs at an increasing rate as it successively internalizes business units and segments. This results in the firm expanding up to the point where, at the margin, the costs of adding a business exactly equal the benefits (Coase 1937 , Williamson 1975 . But here, too, the nature of these bureaucratic costs and how they specifically arise from expansion into related businesses as opposed to unrelated businesses is not explored. A third stream of research in the diversification discount literature takes an ex post perspective and argues that bureaucratic costs arise in multibusiness firms in the form of investment distortions and agency behavior (e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995, Scharfstein and Stein 2000) . In this view the diversified firm expands until its benefits are offset by its ex post inefficiency as an internal capital market. But here as well, although related diversified firms are shown to have more efficient internal capital markets, the disadvantages of these firms are not highlighted. As a result, we have only a cursory understanding of the costs that arise in related diversified firms, and the literature is still at an inception stage in terms of uncovering these costs.
Given the above-stated gaps, in this paper I ask the following questions: What are some mechanisms by which value may be reduced in a related diversified firm? Concomitantly, what are some bureaucratic costs that related segments experience when they are internalized within diversified firms, as opposed to when they operate as single-business firms? Thus, similar to the diversification discount literature, in this paper I will identify some of the ex post costs experienced by a related segment when market governance is substituted by corporate governance in a diversified firm (Jones and Hill 1988) .
Toward addressing the above questions, I begin by arguing that by virtue of being part of a related diversified firm, a segment is subject to various constraints when compared with single-business firms as it coordinates its activities with other segments. Of these other segments, arguably the most prominent is the core business, or the largest segment of the firm (I treat the two as conceptually equivalent 1 ). The core business may provide critical resources to a related segment in the form of knowledge and human capital (Teece 1982) . However, a relatively large core business may also exercise power over a segment in various internal transactions (those that occur between businesses within the firm) and external transactions (those that occur with suppliers and customers) such that in some instances its interests as opposed to the interests of the segment are best served. This power and influence of the core business may occur with the sanction of headquarters or may be directly exerted on the segment. For example, a segment may be constrained to buy inputs from the core business despite the availability of better-quality suppliers. Alternatively, it may be coerced to offer discounts to customers it shares with the core business so that the latter may increase its volume and derive scale economies. Thus the very sharing of transactions with the core business, which in itself is a dimension of relatedness, also has a potential dark side in the sense that it may constrain a segment and lead to productivity shifts that would not occur if it were an autonomous firm. These productivity shifts may create various inefficiencies, such as disincentives to stay productive, and influence activities to prevent such shifts, which raise the costs for a segment in a related diversified firm.
To empirically test these arguments, I use a data set developed by Fan and Lang (2000) . This data set includes all single-business and diversified manufacturing firms in Compustat between 1979 and . It provides detailed information on segments such as Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of the segment, size of the segment, etc. In addition, the data set also provides information on the degree of forward and backward integration between a segment and the core business (defined as the largest segment of the firm in Fan and Lang's database) and the degree of forward and backward complementarity between a segment and the core business. The degree of forward integration is defined as the dollar value of the segment industry's output consumed per dollar of the core businesses industry's output. Similarly, the degree of backward integration is calculated as the dollar value of the core business industry's output consumed per dollar of the segment industry's output. Corresponding to these measures, forward and backward complementarity capture the degree to which the segment and the largest business obtain inputs from and supply outputs to the same customers and supplier industries, respectively, and they are measured as the correlations in dollar values of these inputs and outputs across various industries. These data are constructed from the U.S. interindustry commodity flow "use" tables and have been employed in past diversification literature (Lemelin 1982) as well as in more recent studies (Zhou 2011) . One limitation of the data that should be mentioned up front is that they are based on the assumption that the flows between the core business and segments can be broadly represented by the corresponding interindustry flows, but the data do not contain detailed internal information on these flows within specific firms per se.
Drawing on these data, I argue that although a segment may experience various benefits from being affiliated with the core business, its performance and productivity may be reduced when it shares internal and external transactions with a relatively large core business. In such cases, the latter may influence the segment to make decisions that are consistent with its interests as opposed to the segment's interests. Thus the central hypothesis tested in this study is that the greater the forward and backward vertical integration between the segment and a relatively large core business, and the greater the forward and backward complementarity with a relatively large core business, 2 the lower the productivity of the segment within the diversified firm.
The hypothesis was tested using a multilevel mixed effects regression with segment productivity as the dependent variable. In the multilevel model, segments are nested within firms, and the productivity of a segment is influenced by both segment-level and firm-level characteristics. Because data on segment profitability are missing in several cases in Compustat, and are accounting based rather than market based (thereby excluding the important effect of intangibles; see McGahan and Porter 1997) , I used segment productivity instead of profitability. Segment productivity was measured as the sales of a segment less the sales of an average single-business firm in the same four-digit SIC code with comparable assets, normalized by firm size. Conceptually speaking, the measure captures the extent to which the segment in the diversified firm is generating more or fewer sales, assuming the same asset turnover ratio of single-business firms.
3 In addition to this measure, I also present results with the ratio of actual to expected segment sales, with expected sales once again calculated assuming the same asset turnover ratio as singlebusiness firms. The results are substantively similar for both measures.
In support of my hypothesis, I find that a segment's relatedness with a relatively large core businessspecifically, in terms of forward and backward complementarity-had a negative effect on its productivity. The segment's degree of forward and backward integration with a relatively large core business had an insignificant effect. Thus, as the overlap of external transactions between a segment and a large core business increased, segment productivity decreased. These results are consistent with the proposition that related segments may be experiencing added bureaucratic costs and reduced productivity in diversified firms, potentially because the core business is exerting power and is constraining the segments to subsidize it in various transactions.
In addition, I also hypothesized and found that core business productivity (measured in a manner similar to segment productivity) was enhanced when the degree of forward and backward complementarity and the degree of backward integration with segments in the firm increased. Thus whereas sharing transactions with a relatively large core business decreased a segment's productivity, interconnectedness between the core business and various segments correspondingly increased core business productivity. This result further corroborates the argument that the core business may be shifting some productivity gains toward itself from the segments through various internal and external transactions.
The above results support the main thesis regarding shifts in productivity from related segments to the core business; here, I provide two further findings that specifically pertain to whether these internal dynamics and shifts in productivity were detrimental to overall firm value. First, I find that rather than being negatively correlated, segment productivity and core business productivity were positively associated with each other. This implies that while the core business may be decreasing a segment's productivity, it does not do so up to the point that the net benefits and net economies of scope for the segment are exceeded. If that were the case, segment productivity would have fallen as core business productivity increased, leading to a negative association and a zero-sum, rather than a positive-sum, outcome. Second, I examined the impact of core business productivity and segment productivity on firm value, measured by Tobin's Q. In this regression, core business productivity and segment productivity were treated as endogenous and as a function of the input/output relatedness coefficients. The instruments I used were the industry average Tobin's Q of the core business and the segment, respectively. My results suggest that the impact core business productivity had on value was insignificant rather than negative, indicating that it did not reach the point of destroying the full benefits of related diversification. In contrast, weighted average segment productivity had a positive significant impact. In my sample, therefore, related diversified firms did not appear to be experiencing overall value destruction despite the core business influencing related segments and shifting productivity gains toward itself.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, as noted earlier, the paper attempts to highlight that the power and influence exerted by the core business, and the subsidization of the core business by related segments through productivity shifts, may be an important source of costs experienced by segments in related diversified firms. In recent years there has been growing interest in terms of understanding the coordination costs in related diversified firms and their impact on profitability. For example, Rawley (2010) highlights the effect of organizational rigidities and the firm's inability to adapt its legacy business when it diversifies as a source of coordination costs. Along similar lines, Zhou (2011) argues that intrafirm complexity and relatedness, measured as the segment pairs that supplied significant inputs to each other, increase coordination costs at an increasing rate, leading to lower diversification entry. My approach builds on these perspectives and highlights the power exerted by the core business on related segments as a component of diversification costs. In doing so, it differs from the above-mentioned studies in the sense that it is in the tradition of agency theory and TCE and draws on managerial opportunism rather than purely adaptation costs. In this regard it is also worth noting that whereas prior diversification literature has mainly highlighted the effects of managerial opportunism and agency behavior in pursuing unrelated diversification, my approach highlights the fact that agency behavior may also be prevalent within related diversified firms as core business managers attempt to exploit other related businesses for their own benefit.
The second contribution of the paper is that it examines how the performances of various segments within the diversified firm impact each other. This is in contrast with previous research where the focus has typically been on overall firm performance as a function of diversification, rather than on the interrelationship between the performance of segments. The approach presented here provides insight into whether there is value redistribution occurring between the different businesses of a related diversified firm, not just owing to the reallocation of funds and "socialism" by headquarters as the diversification discount literature posits but also owing to the power exerted by the core business in the related diversified firm. Thus in the diversification discount literature the focus is on weak divisions being subsidized by strong divisions in internal capital markets (Villalonga 2004a) ; my approach is complementary in that it highlights the fact that the core business can be subsidized by related segments in diversified firms through various mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In §2 I develop in further detail the theoretical proposition that the core business can exert power on a related segment. In doing so, I highlight the specific assumptions and the model of the firm implicit in my analysis. In §3 I describe the data structure and discuss the methods used in this study. I present the results in §4 and conclude with a discussion in §5.
of scope in various intangible resources. Intangible resources confer scope economies because they tend to be fungible in nature and transferable to various businesses without loss in value (Teece 1982) . In addition, intangible resources have a public good character and are scale free (Kumar 2009, Levinthal and Wu 2009) in the sense that once developed, they can be reutilized at fairly low marginal costs. Although this logic suggests that, ceteris paribus, related diversification could be more value creating than unrelated diversification (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) , the question remains: What are some of the mechanisms by which value is reduced within related diversified firms?
To address this question, it is necessary to understand some of the costs that arise when corporate governance and hierarchies replace market mechanisms in allocating resources (Jones and Hill 1988) . Diversified firms are complex organizational forms with information differentials and asymmetries between managers of divisions and headquarters. This creates scope for opportunistic behavior, as divisional managers use their superior information about various operations to influence decision making in their favor throughout the organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1988 , Scharfstein and Stein 2000 , Wulf 2009 ).
Although it is generally accepted that power and influence activities are a significant component of coordination costs in firms, in the case of a diversified firm, one particular "influencer" that is likely to have significant power over headquarters and other businesses is the core business (comprising the divisional head, managers, etc.). There are various reasons why the core business may be particularly influential compared with other businesses. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggests that any actor that is central and provides resources to other actors would tend to have greater power. The core business is likely to enjoy such power by virtue of being a primary source of financial resources and various proprietary resources that confer scope economies such as technical and research and development (R&D) knowledge (Miller et al. 2007 ). Second, because of its size, the core business is also likely to provide important stability and reliability for the firm at various points in time (Hannan and Freeman 1989) . This stability may help smaller businesses sustain themselves, for example, in periods when external resources are not munificent, thereby increasing their chances of survival compared with stand-alone firms. Moreover, to the extent that the core business is the legacy business, the dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986, p. 491) imprinting the firm is also likely to be derived from it. As a result, the core business is likely to receive disproportionate attention from the top managers and headquarters during the process of resource allocation, with its goals and objectives taking precedence over those of other business units.
These arguments highlight reasons for why the core business may have a disproportionate influence on decision making at headquarters (Milgrom and Roberts 1988) , but it is possible that the core business may also exert influence on segments directly 4 without the headquarters' intervention. In a diversified firm, interdivisional flows and transfers are partly centralized and coordinated through headquarters, but the coordination is also partly decentralized as divisions directly communicate among themselves, rather than through headquarters. The advantage of decentralization is that it allows headquarters to free up valuable capacity and constrained cognitive resources (Kumar 2009, Levinthal and Wu 2010) for strategic thinking (Chandler 1962) . Decentralized communication saves time, increases responsiveness to market conditions, and allows segments to facilitate the product flows that occur between them. But at the same time, it also opens up a channel through which one division can directly influence another for its own benefit, without being detected by headquarters. It is through both of these channels (i.e., through headquarters and through direct contact) that a relatively large core business can exert power and influence over smaller segments.
In principle, resources transferred from the core business enable segments to compete more effectively in their industry. In return, however, by exercising power and influence both directly and through headquarters, the core business may extract its pound of flesh and constrain the segments to subsidize it in various ways. One mechanism through which this subsidization may occur is in the transactions shared between the core business and the segment. For example, a smaller segment in a business that is downstream may be constrained to buy inputs from the core business despite the availability of better-quality suppliers. In the long run, this may increase the production cost structure of the segment and offset some of the benefits of sharing knowledge and resources with the core business. Similarly, an upstream segment may be forced to supply a significant proportion of its output to the core business as opposed to other high-quality, sophisticated customers. The resulting internal transfer may hinder the segment's ability to sense the latest market developments, thereby making it less competitive in the long run. In addition to these mechanisms, a segment may be coerced to offer discounts to customers shared with the core business so that the latter may increase its volume (an argument consistent with the literature on "negotiated transfer pricing," which proposes that conflicts arise between divisions when there is overlap in transactions and that these conflicts are resolved through costly negotiation between managers; see Watson and Baumler 1975) . Furthermore, a related segment may also be required to procure inputs from the same suppliers as the core business, although other suppliers may be better suited to its operations.
5
In sum, the power exerted by the core business (either through direct influence or through headquarters' influence) may increase the production cost structure of the segment by not exposing it to sophisticated customers and/or by constraining it to procure inputs from specific suppliers and the core business. Alternatively, the segment may realize lower revenues or volumes for the same level of assets a single-business firm has, as the segment develops inferior capabilities in the long run as a result of these factors.
6 Both these mechanisms may reduce the productivity of a segment within the diversified firm compared with when it is a stand-alone firm.
The motive for core business managers to exert power and influence over segments ultimately stems from the benefits they can capture from such activities. Using the above mechanisms, if core business managers are able to shift productivity gains toward themselves from segments and show better performance, then they can potentially demand higher compensation for their services from headquarters. Alternatively, these shifts in productivity may enable them to sustain their power within the firm and maintain their status as a dominant coalition. From the headquarters standpoint, subsidizing the core business may be justified to some extent, given the role it plays in lending overall stability and the impact it has on the identity of the firm in the eyes of external stakeholders. From the segment manager's standpoint, there may be a willingness to subsidize the core business as long as the net gains for the segment are positive; i.e., the benefits provided by the core business in the form of shared resources still exceed the added costs as a result of its power and influence over decision making. Nevertheless, increases in the core businesses' power and influence may create increasing disincentives for the segment's managers to devote effort and stay productive (i.e., the disincentives may increase at an increasing rate with transfers to the core business). That is because whatever gains divisional managers generate are likely to be appropriated and used to subsidize the core business, rather than being reflected in their performance. Under these circumstances, segments may be relegated to the role of being a support division of the core business, rather than being treated as independent value-creating divisions in their own right. This excessive influence of the core business on segments in turn may also call for intervention by headquarters to ensure that value is not destroyed for the firm as a whole.
The above arguments can be formalized in a simple model. Let ES denote the economies of scope generated by the sharing of resources between a core business and a segment. These scope economies may arise as a result of the sharing of knowledge, as well as the sharing of customers, suppliers, and internal transactions within the firm. Let C denote the costs exerted by the core business on the segment in the form of constraints on common transactions and productivity transfers. Then Net benefits/net economies of scope to the segment = ES − C
Added benefits to the core business
To capture the productivity gains of C from the segment, the core business may engage in costly influence activities, either with headquarters or with the segment itself. Let these costs be denoted by I. Further, as noted above, as productivity gains are transferred from the segments to the core business, disincentives are created for the segment managers. Let D represent the loss in productivity as a result of these lower incentives along with the costs of any influence activities undertaken by segment managers to neutralize the power of the core business. Taking these costs into consideration, Equations (1) and (2) can be modified as follows:
Net productivity gains of segment (NS)
Net added benefits to the core business (NC)
In addition to these costs, to the extent that core business managers have incentives to shift as many gains as possible toward their division (even beyond what is sanctioned by headquarters in order to maximize their performance and sustain their influence), headquarters will need to step in and monitor the core managers to ensure that this transfer does not destroy value for the firm as a whole. Let these monitoring costs be denoted by M. The net benefits (NB) to the firm under these conditions can be calculated as
As (5) suggests, the diversified firm maximizes value when NB is maximized. To the extent that the influence and power exerted by the core business becomes excessive, then the related diversified firm may experience a loss in value as ES < D + I + M.
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The above model offers various testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis pertains to the costs borne by segments and the impact on their productivity by virtue of being part of a related diversified firm. Equation (3) suggests that as the influence exerted by the core business denoted by C increases, net segment performance and productivity decrease; C, in turn, is likely to be a function of two components. The first is the size of the core business in the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Scott 1992) . A relatively larger core business is likely to have greater power and influence in decision making than a core business that is not dominant in terms of size. Complementing the size effect, as argued earlier, the greater the internal and external transactions shared between the segment and the core business, the higher the C, as there are more channels through which the core business can exert its influence over segments and constrain them to take actions that are in its best interests. If the core business and the segment did not share any transactions, then the potential for productivity transfers denoted by C would be relatively lower, and relatedness, in essence, enhances the potential for productivity transfers for a large core business from segments. This suggests the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, the higher the relatedness of a segment in terms of internal and external transactions with a relatively large core business, the lower the segment productivity.
Hypothesis 1 takes into account that power (proxied by size) and relatedness together influence the extent of productivity transfers to the core business from segments in related diversified firms.
The second hypothesis, based on the above arguments, is a mirror image of Hypothesis 1. To the extent that the core business is exerting power and influence on segments through various transactions and shifting productivity gains toward itself, the greater the shared transactions with the segments, the higher the productivity of the core business. This relates to the effect of C in (4). Hence, Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the higher the relatedness of the core business in terms of internal and external transactions with the segments, the higher its productivity.
Although Hypotheses 1 and 2 are the main focus of the study and illustrate the costs borne by related segments in diversified firms, the model developed above also offers some testable propositions with regard to overall firm value and performance. Equations (3) and (4) suggest that at the margin, when a segment is added to a related diversified firm, if the power and influence exerted by the core business is not destroying value (potentially because of optimal monitoring by headquarters), then both segment and core business productivity would move in the same direction and be positively associated. This would occur as economies of scope are not fully offset for the segment, while at the same time some, productivity gains are transferred from the segment to the core business. In other words, both ES − C − D > 0 and C − I > 0. However, if influence costs are destroying value, and the core business is extracting more productivity gains from segments than it is adding in the form of scope economies, then there would be a negative correlation between the two productivities as ES − C − D < 0 and C − I > 0. Intuitively, the idea is that if value is being destroyed in the diversified firm as a result of the dynamics described above, then a potential implication is that there may be a zero-sum relationship and a negative association between the productivities of the core business and the segment. If, on the other hand, value is not being destroyed on the whole as a result of transfers in productivity, then there would be a positivesum association with both the core business and the segment simultaneously enjoying productivity gains.
The correlation between core business and segment productivity is a test indicative of whether value is being destroyed in related diversified firms as a result of productivity transfers and subsidization of the core business. An alternative way to test whether the power and influence exerted by the core business is reaching suboptimal levels is to directly examine the impact of the two productivities on overall firm value. Extending the above arguments, if the power and influence exerted by the core business over segments exceeds economies of scope, then core business productivity would negatively influence firm value despite productivity gains being transferred from segments. This would occur as the productivity transfers lead to various inefficiencies for segments, such as disincentives to stay productive, which offset scope economies. On the other hand, if the power and influence exerted by the core business has not reached the suboptimal point and is sufficiently contained (for example, through monitoring by headquarters), then core business productivity will not have a negative impact on overall firm value. In addition to testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, I also examine these two implications for firm value in my empirical analyses below. Figure 1 provides an overview of the Fan and Lang (2000) database that I use to test my hypotheses (available at http://ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/~b109671/pages/ relatedness_project.html, accessed January 2009). The database builds on the commodity flow data (or input/ output data) collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) every five years. These data are represented in a "use table" that contains roughly 500 pairs of manufacturing industries. Between any pair of industries i and j, the use table reports the dollar value of i's output that is consumed in the production of the total output of industry j. Fan and Lang (2000) first normalize the data in the use table by dividing the value of i's output to j by j's total output. This gives the forward relatedness coefficient F in Figure 1 , which ranges between 0 and 1. Correspondingly, the backward integration coefficient of i with respect to j, denoted by B in Figure 1 , is obtained by dividing j's dollar output to i divided by total output of i. To obtain the forward complementary coefficient CF, the correlation between the dollar values of 
Methods

Data
Input industries
Note. F, forward vertical relatedness between segment i and the core business; B, backward vertical relatedness between segment i and the core business; CB, backward complementarity between segment i and the core business; CF, forward complementarity between segment i and the core business.
outputs provided to various intermediate industries by industries i and j is calculated. Similarly, the backward complementarity coefficient CB is calculated as the correlation between the dollar value of inputs procured by i and j from various industries. The approach of using correlations of inputs and outputs for a pair of industries to measure complementarity is also used by Robins and Wiersema (1995) . However, these authors rely on technology flow data (Scherer 1982) , rather than product flow data, which may be appropriate for a broader set of nontechnologically intensive industries.
Once the coefficients are calculated at the industry level, they are then matched with the SIC codes of a segment and the core business (defined as the largest business in the Lan and Fang database) for all multisegment, diversified firms between 1979 and 1997. For example, for the firm Air Products and Chemicals, where the core business is SIC 2813 (industrial gases) and one of the segments listed is SIC 3559 (equipment and services), 0.24 cents' worth of equipment and services were consumed for every dollar of industrial gases produced. Hence F = 0 0024 for this particular segment. Similarly, the use table suggests that 0.72 cents' worth of output of industrial gases is consumed by equipment and services for every dollar of output; i.e., B = 0 0072. Corresponding to the above measures, the correlation of outputs of SIC 3559 and SIC 2813 to industries C1, C2, etc., is 0.21. Hence for segment SIC 3559 in Air Products and Chemicals, CF= 0 21. The larger the correlation, the greater the overlap between the customers of the core business and the segment. Finally, for Air Products and Chemicals, the correlation between the inputs of SIC 2813 and SIC 3559 obtained from industries I1, I2, etc. was 0.59, which provides the value of the coefficient CB.
The four coefficients F, B, CF, and CB reflect the extent to which a segment shares various internal (F and B) and external transactions (CF and CB) with the core business. One disadvantage is that the input/output data are collected only every five years. In the sample period of 1979-1997, these years were 1982, 1987, and 1992 . Hence the intersegment flows contained lesser heterogeneity than the other firm-level variables that were used for the study, which were constructed on a yearly basis. Specifically, the 1982 data were used to represent the flows between segments for all firms between 1979 and 1986, the 1987 data were used for the period 1987-1991, and the 1992 data for the period 1992-1997. In the Air Products and Chemicals example discussed above, the segment information is from 1997, and the intersegment flows are calculated based on 1992 input/output data. More recently, building on the Teece et al. (1994) coherence measure, Bryce and Winter (2009) develop a generalized interindustry index of relatedness. The Bryce and Winter measure is finegrained and captures relatedness at the four-digit SIC level. However, it is based only on one year of data drawn from the Census of Manufacturers conducted in 1987. Hence there is lesser heterogeneity in this measure compared with the commodity flow data, which is why I preferred the latter. 
Model and Measures
Hypothesis 1 calls for examining segment productivity as a function of the four coefficients B, C, CF, and CB and the relative size of the core business. To test Hypothesis 1, I use a multilevel model where segments are nested within firms, and the productivity of segments is influenced by both firm-level characteristics (apart from relative core business size, by factors such as R&D intensity, total number of segments, etc.) and segment characteristics F, B, CF, and CB. My data set also has a panel structure with observations spanning the years 1979-1997. The year 1997 was used as a cutoff because after 1997, the accounting standard for reporting segments (based on the Statements of Financial Accounting Standards, or SFAS) was changed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (Kumar 2009 ). Before 1998, segments were reported according to industries (SFAS 14); since 1998, they have been reported according to internal units rather than distinguishable businesses (SFAS 131).
The mutilevel model approach that I adopt in this study has been gaining traction in strategy research (e.g., Hitt et al. 2007 ). The main advantage of the approach is that it makes use of the nested structure of the data within different levels of analyses to test relationships that cannot be tested in typical regressions, such as, in my case, the effect of interactions between lower-level segment factors and higher-level firm factors on segment productivity. Multilevel models contain both fixed and random effects. The fixed effects are estimated directly, whereas the random effects are assessed by the degree of variance they account for. To test my hypothesis concerning segment productivity, I employed a model with the following structure:
where i = 1 n segments and j = 1 m firms (for convenience, I leave out time). The dependent variable Y is the productivity of a segment, X consists of various segment-level variables and controls, Z comprises various firm-level variables, and x * z contains cross-level interactions. The fixed effects are represented by the coefficients 1 , 2 , and 3 . In this model, there are two sources of random variability (apart from time): variability that stems from segments and variability that stems from firms. The model allows the intercept of segments to vary from firm to firm as a function of firm characteristics represented by Z. The term j captures the random component of this variation. The model also allows the slope of each segment to vary across segments within firms based on the cross-level interactions x * z; u i j denotes the random component of the variation in slope. Stata's xtmixed command was used in the estimation. When running the regressions, I allowed for the random effects to be correlated by specifying the cov(unstructured) option, as opposed to imposing the condition that they are uncorrelated, which is the default in Stata.
The dependent variable in testing Hypothesis 1 is the productivity of a segment within the diversified firm. I measured segment productivity, denoted by the variable SEGPROD, as below. Note that single-segment firms serve as benchmarks in the analyses, and hence I do not include them separately as observations in my segmentlevel regressions. Segment productivity i (SEGPROD) is given by
where k = 1 l denotes single-segment firms in the same SIC code as segment i, and w k is the sales weight or the proportion of sales contributed by firm k among these l firms. The measure's advantage is that it uses productivity to gauge the performance of a segment in a related diversified firm as opposed to profitability, which tends to be missing in a number of cases. The measure is equivalent to subtracting the segment's expected sales from its actual sales, assuming the same asset turnover ratio as single-business firms, and then normalizing by firm size. Conceptually speaking, normalization takes into account the fact that a given deviation in productivity in sales implies a greater distortion when it occurs in a smaller firm rather than a larger firm. Prior studies in the diversification discount literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995) use the natural log of the ratio of actual to expected values, rather than normalizing the excess sales by firm size as I do above. Below I present results using the measure computed previously. As a robustness check, I also present results with productivity calculated as the natural log of the ratio of actual to expected segment sales based on the asset turnover ratio. I included various segment-level controls corresponding to X in Equation (6). First, I included a dummy variable denoting whether the segment is in the same two-digit SIC code as the core business. This variable controls for other forms of synergy between the core business and the segment not captured by the coefficients B, F , CF, and CB, and it has been found to have a significant impact on productivity in diversified firms in previous studies (e.g., Schoar 2002) . In addition to the SIC dummy, I included the four coefficients F , B, CF, and CB as controls to filter out the main effects of these variables before interacting them with relative core size.
The variables in Z in (6) are measured at the firm level as opposed to the segment level. Relative core business size, measured as core segment sales divided by total firm sales, is included in Z to control for the positive/negative effects of a large core business independent of its overlap of transactions with the segment (RELCORE). I include R&D intensity (RDINT) and capital intensity (CAPINT) to account for the effects of the firm's technological strength on segment productivity. On the one hand, high RDINT and CAPINT can indicate that a firm has a greater stock of skills to exploit, which can raise segment productivity. On the other hand, high RDINT and CAPINT can also indicate a lack of scope economies (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) as knowledge becomes very specialized to certain contexts and industries. I also include two firm-level diversification variables, the number of segments (SEGNUM) and the Herfindahl index of diversification (HERF); these controls account for the diversity in terms of businesses and size of segments, respectively, in the firm. Apart from these variables, I also include the sales weighted average Tobin's Q (measured as market to book) of single-business firms in the same SIC code as the core business (COREQ). Tobin's Q has been shown to be correlated with the extent of valuable intangibles (Villalonga 2004b) . By including it as a control, I account for the impact of valuable intangible assets associated with the core business industry on segment productivity. Corresponding to COREQ, the sales weighted average Tobin's Q of single-business firms in the same SIC code as the segment is also included as a control (SEGQ).
In testing my hypotheses, my main interest lies in the cross-level interactions x * z in Equation (6). These interactions include the interaction between RELCORE and the coefficients F , B, CF, and CB. Hypothesis 1 predicts that these interactions will be negative as a relatively larger core business within the diversified firm constrains the segments and influences them in various internal/ external transactions. Thus the interaction terms capture the joint effect of a large core business and the relatedness with the core business on segment productivity.
To test Hypothesis 2, I use a fixed effects model with core business productivity as the dependent variable (COREPROD). Core business productivity is calculated similarly to segment productivity described above. For every firm in my sample, I have one core business productivity observation. In this analysis as well, I do not include single-segment firms; these firms serve as benchmarks in calculating core business productivity. To check for the robustness of results, core business productivity was also calculated as the natural log of actual to imputed segment sales.
Paralleling the segment-level regression, in the core business productivity regression, I aggregated segmentlevel variables to form corresponding firm-level variables. Thus I aggregated the four variables F , B, CF, and CB by weighting each variable by the proportion of segment sales and then summing the weighted coefficients. The procedure resulted in four weighted relatedness variables 10 at the firm level (WTDF, WTDB, WTDCF, and WTDCB). Hypothesis 2 predicts that the higher the relatedness in terms of transactions with segments, the higher the core business productivity, as the latter is able to exercise greater power through various transactions and shift productivity gains toward itself. Hence I expect that one or more of the variables WTDF, WTDB, WTDCF, and WTDCB will be positive and significant in the COREPROD fixed effects regression. The weighted procedure does have one disadvantage in that if the core business is relatively large and accounts for a higher proportion of total firm sales, the weighted relatedness variables would take on lower values. In other words, for the same levels of F , B, CF, and CB, a larger core business would produce lower values of WTDF, WTDB, WTDCF, and WTDCB than a smaller core business would, because in the former case the weights would also be smaller. Thus, strictly speaking, positive coefficients of these variables in the regression would support the effect of relatedness with segments, rather than the effect of core business size. To address this limitation, I report below a robustness test that further explores the impact of relative core business size on core business productivity.
Apart from WTDF, WTDB, WTDCF, and WTDCB, the core productivity regression contained several other controls similar to the segment-level regressions. First, I took the proportion of segments in the firm that were in a different two-digit SIC code than the core business as a control for unrelatedness. Another important control I included was relative core size.
11 I included R&D intensity and capital intensity to control for the technological strength of the firm. Other controls included the number of segments in the firm, the Herfindahl index, the Tobin's Q of the core business industry, and the Tobin's Q of single-segment firms in the various industries as the firm's segments, weighted by segment sales (WTDSEGQ).
Apart from the segment productivity and core business productivity regressions used to test the two hypotheses, I also conducted additional tests to examine performance at the overall firm level. As argued earlier, if core business power and influence does not reach the point of being suboptimal, then segment productivity and core business productivity will be positively associated with each other, rather than being negatively correlated. This would occur as both the segment and the core business benefit from related diversification. I tested these effects in two ways. First, I added COREPROD to the segmentlevel regression with an expected positive sign. Second, I added weighted segment productivity (WTDSEGPROD) as a variable to the fixed effects COREPROD equation, also with an expected positive sign.
In addition to the correlation between segment and core business productivities, I examined the effect of the two productivities on overall firm value. I used instrumental variable regression to test these effects. The dependent variable in the firm value regression is Tobin's Q. The endogenous variables are COREPROD and WTDSEGPROD. In this regression, the two endogenous variables are instrumented in the first stage by the industry average Tobin's Q of the core business and the segments (i.e., COREQ and WTDSEGQ). Thus the assumption is that industry opportunities determine to what extent the core business and segments receive resources independent of influence activities. The expectation was that after controlling for endogeneity, if core business power has not reached suboptimal levels, then the two forms of productivity would not negatively impact firm value.
Results
Sample Description and Summary Statistics
After combining all data items and excluding observations with missing data, my final sample comprised 13,558 segment-years. These segments belonged to 1,691 firms with an average of 6.37 years per segment. The 1,691 firms had an average of 2.26 segments including the core business. Corresponding to the 13,558 segment-year observations, there were 10,770 firm-year observations in the sample. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables appearing in the segment-level regressions used to test Hypothesis 1. Table 2 provides the correlations of these variables. Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the additional variables used to test Hypothesis 2 pertaining to core business productivity. Table 4 provides the correlations. All variables were Winsorized at the 1% level. The summary statistics in Tables 1 and 3 highlight some important points. Specifically, they show that mean segment productivity (SEGPROD), was negative with a mean of −0 01, whereas COREPROD was positive with a mean of 0.05. Both values were significantly different from 0 at the p = 0 000 level. These results are comparable with Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) , who find that large segments in diversified firms tend to be more productive than their single-business counterparts, whereas smaller segments tend to be less productive. Further analyses of these results revealed that of the 13,558 segment-years, in 8,133 cases (59.9%) segment productivity was greater than 0. Of the 10,770 firm-year observations for the core business, in 6,162 observations (57.22%) core business productivity was greater than 0. Thus, based on the summary statistics, it cannot definitively be concluded that segments of diversified firms are necessarily less productive than their single-business counterparts. Nevertheless, there is evidence of lower productivity in a significant proportion of segments, indicating that the costs borne by segments within diversified firms are significant. Table 1 further shows that, on average, segments were not forward and backward integrated with the core business to a significant extent. The coefficients of F and B had means of 0.01 each. In terms of complementarity with the core business, the values were much higher. The mean of forward complementarity CF was 0.22, and the mean of backward complementarity CB was 0.48. The average sales of a segment in my sample was USD483 million. In contrast, the mean sales of single business firms in the same four-digit SIC code was USD296 million. Thus the segments of diversified firms were significantly larger compared with the size of single-business firms (p = 0 000).
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In terms of the variables in Table 3 , the weighted average forward integration of segments WTDF was 0.02, and the weighted average backward integration WTDB was 0.042.
13 Table 2 shows that the weighted average forward complementarity in the firm was 0.36, and the weighted average backward complementarity was 0.78. These results compare well with Fan and Lang (2000) . In terms of size, the average sales of the core business among firms in my sample was USD1,032 million. The core business was roughly 2.7 times as large as the average segment within the firm. The corresponding singlebusiness firm sales in the same four-digit SIC code as the core business was USD260 million, indicating once again that the core business was much larger than the single-business firms in its industry. Tables 2 and 4 show that all correlations were within the acceptable range and did not raise any concerns of 
multicollinearity. In addition to the summary statistics reported in Tables 1-4 , I examined the variation in my key independent variables appearing in the core business productivity regression to determine whether there was adequate heterogeneity in these variables over time. This was of concern because, as noted earlier, the industry flow data are gathered only every five years by the BEA, thus there may be inadequate heterogeneity for reliable Note. n = 10 770.
estimation in the fixed effects regression. The summary statistics indicated the following. First, there was significant variation in WTDCF and WTDCB. Whereas the mean of WTDCB was 0.78, the intrafirm variation was 0.32. Similarly, whereas the mean of WTDCF was 0.37, the intrafirm variation was 0.29. In comparison, the means and variances of WTDF (0.02 and 0.04, respectively) and WTDB (0.04 and 0.04, respectively) were lower. Second, there was also significant variation in the number of segments (mean of 3 and SD of 0.6) and relative core business sales (mean of 0.63 and SD of 0.08).
Thus there was adequate variation in the different variables to suggest that inferences can be drawn reliably from the fixed effects model.
Regression Results
Panel A in Table 5 presents the results of the multilevel regression with segment productivity as the dependent variable. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the higher the relatedness of a segment with a relatively large core business in terms of internal and external transactions, the lower the productivity of the segment as the core business exerts power through these transactions to shift productivity gains toward itself. To test this hypothesis, I interacted the relative size of the core business, RELCORE with F, B, CF, and CB. Column (I) in Table 5 shows that two of the interaction terms were negatively signed and significant, RELCORE× CF and RELCORE× CB. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. In terms of the main effects of the variables, the results are consistent with the significance of the interaction terms. The coefficient of CF is negative and significant in column (I) in Table 5 , along with the coefficient of CB. Thus, independent of the size of the core business, forward and backward complementarity seemed to have hurt segment productivity, although the detrimental effect gets more pronounced when the size of the core business is large. Similarly, column (I) in Table 5 shows that independent of F , B, CF, and CB, RELCORE also had a negative significant impact on productivity. A large core business in the firm, on average, hurts the productivity of segments. The bottom rows in Table 5 also show that the random effects parameters were significant and positive at the firm and segment levels. The segment level explains a greater percentage of the variance than the firm level-roughly 35% versus 31%. These results suggest that the use of mixed effects regression to test Hypothesis 1 was justified.
In terms of the effects of the remaining control variables in column (I) in Table 5 , the dummy variable SIC2DIGIT was negative and significant. Productivity was enhanced when the segment was in the same two-digit SIC code as the core business, potentially because of a greater relatedness of knowledge and scope economies. Consistent with prior research, the number of segments (SEGNUM) was negatively associated with segment productivity. The more diverse a firm, the lower the segment productivity relative to its single-business peers as managing the diversity became more complex. RDINT and CAPINT had a negative impact on segment productivity. This result is consistent with Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) , who argue that firms with strong resources are likely to perform better if they remain focused because their skills are specialized and they lack Notes. The dependent variable is segment productivity; n =13,558. LR, likelihood ratio. * p < 0 05; * * p < 0 01; * * * p < 0 001.
scope economies. Table 5 also shows that the Tobin's Q of the core business industry had a positive impact on segment productivity. Ceteris paribus, being affiliated with a core business industry that is intangible intensive appears to improve segment productivity as these intangibles spill over and provide scope economies. Finally, the average Tobin's Q of the segment's industry was positively associated with segment productivity. It is possible that, independent of the effects of core business size and the sharing of transactions, segments in high Q industries are able to negotiate and garner more resources within the diversified firm and be relatively independent of influence activities, which enhances their performance.
Although column (I) in Table 5 presents the main results pertaining to Hypothesis 1, I also conducted an important additional robustness check. As discussed earlier, the analysis in column (I) relies on a measure of productivity that takes the excess/deficit sales of the segment and normalizes them by firm size, assuming the same asset turnover ratio as single-business firms. A potential disadvantage of the measure is that, because firm size appears in the denominator, it could lead to spurious correlations with the independent variables that have also been normalized by firm size, such as RELCORE and its four interaction terms. To address this limitation, I conducted the mixed effects regression using the natural log of the ratio of the actual sales of the segment to the imputed sales of the segment as the measure of productivity (Berger and Ofek 1995) . The imputed sales is once again the expected sales of the segment, assuming the same asset turnover ratio as a single-business firm. Column (III) of panel B in Table 5 provides the results of this analysis; the results are consistent with those presented in column (I) in Table 5 . The interaction terms RELCORE × CF and RELCORE × CB continued to remain negative and significant. The remaining control variables also retained their significance, and the results are in line with those reported in column (I). Taken together, the consistency of results across the two productivity measures in terms of the negative effects of forward and backward complementarity with a relatively large core business lends further support to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 calls for testing core business productivity as a function of relatedness with various segments. The logic behind the hypothesis is that the greater the backward and forward integration with the segments, and the greater the complementarity shared with the segments, the higher the productivity of the core business as it exercises its power and influence to shift productivity gains toward itself. Panel A in Table 6 presents Copyright: INFORMS holds copyright to this Articles in Advance version, which is made available to subscribers. The file may not be posted on any other website, including the author's site. Please send any questions regarding this policy to permissions@informs.org. Note. The dependent variable is core business productivity; n = 10 770. * p < 0 05; * * p < 0 01; * * * p < 0 001.
the results of the fixed effects regression. Of the four weighted average coefficients constructed at the firm level, three of them-WTDB, WTDCF, and WTDCBare positive and significant at the p = 0 000 level. Thus in support of Hypothesis 2, the sharing of transactions with the segments appeared to have enhanced core business productivity. Panel A in Table 6 also shows that the relative size of the core business had a positive impact on core productivity independent of its relatedness with segments. Although this correlation may be partly mechanical, as core business sales also appears in the dependent variable, it is possible that a relatively large core has greater bargaining power in the diversified firm, which enables it to procure more resources and enhance productivity. The remaining control variables have coefficients that are consistent with the results reported in Table 5 .
Panel B in Table 6 presents the results when core business productivity was calculated as the natural log of actual to expected segment sales. The results are once again consistent with those presented in panel A in Table 6 . The three weighted measures WTDB, WTDCF, and WTDCB had significant positive coefficients. Taken together, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that when there is a sharing of transactions between a core business and its segments, the core business appears to benefit in terms of productivity, whereas the segments seem to experience lower productivity compared with singlebusiness firms. These results highlight the fact that the power and influence exerted by the core business, and its subsidization, is a potential cost of related diversification for segments.
It was earlier argued that if, on average, the core business was contributing economies of scope that exceeded the productivity gains it transferred to itself, then core business productivity and segment productivity will be positively associated with each other. This prediction contrasts with a "zero-sum" negative association between the two productivities, which is likely to occur if the core business extracts more productivity gains for itself than it contributes in the form of scope economies. Thus the theoretical significance of the association between the two productivities is that it provides a preliminary test of whether the power and influence exerted by the core business on related segments is destroying value, on average, for related diversified firms. To gain insight into this issue, I first added core business productivity as an independent variable to the segment-level regression. I added core business productivity both before and after I included the interaction terms used to test Hypothesis 1. The results, presented in column (II) of panel A in Table 5 , showed that core business productivity was strongly positively associated with segment productivity (p = 0 000). This result is also observed in column (IV) of panel B in Table 5 , with productivity measured as the log of the ratio of actual to expected sales.
As an alternative way to examine the correlation between the two productivities, I also added weighted segment productivity as an independent variable in the fixed effect regressions used to examine core business productivity. The results suggested that weighted segment productivity had an insignificant impact on core business productivity (results not reported). This result was observed using both measures of productivity. Overall, there was some support for the proposition that the power and influence exerted by the core business was not occurring to the point that it was destroying value for the diversified firm.
To further examine this point, next I regressed the two productivities on firm value. In this analysis I used fixed effects instrumental variable regression with Tobin's Q measured at the firm level as the dependent variable. Table 7 presents the results. COREPROD and WTDSEGPROD were instrumented in the first stage by COREQ and WTDSEGQ. These instruments were excluded in the second-stage Tobin's Q equation. The logic was that industry opportunities will directly influence the resources allocated to the core business and segments within the diversified firm, and they will only indirectly influence firm value through these mechanisms. As shown in panel A in Table 7 , core business productivity had an insignificant impact on firm value when using this procedure. In contrast, weighted segment productivity had a positive significant impact. Panel B in Table 7 replicates the analyses using the second measure of productivity. In this regression, both core productivity and weighted segment productivity had a positive significant impact on firm value. Overall, these results, combined with the correlations between the Note. n =10,770. * p < 0 05; * * p < 0 01; * * * p < 0 001. Notes. The dependent variable is segment productivity; n = 13 558. LR, likelihood ratio. * p < 0 05; * * p < 0 01; * * * p < 0 001.
two productivities, suggest that the power and influence exerted by the core business on related segments did not reach the suboptimal point of destroying value for the related diversified firm.
The main results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 , but I also conducted various robustness checks to gain further insight into my hypothesized relationships. First, I created two subsamples comprising firms that were narrowly diversified (i.e., number of segments below or equal to the median of 3) and where the core business was either smaller or larger than the median. In the first subsample, the core business is likely to have lower power, because the segments are few but relatively large. By contrast, in the second subsample, the core business is likely to be more influential. The results of the regressions in these two subsamples are presented in panel A of Tables 8 and 9, respectively. As shown in panel A in Table 8 , the results were significantly weaker in the subsample where the core business was relatively small. Only the RELCORE × CF interaction was negative and significant in the segment productivity regression. By contrast, when the core business was relatively large, three of the four interactions were significant and Copyright: INFORMS holds copyright to this Articles in Advance version, which is made available to subscribers. The file may not be posted on any other website, including the author's site. Please send any questions regarding this policy to permissions@informs.org. Note. The dependent variable is core business productivity; n =10,770. * p < 0 05; * * p < 0 01; * * * p < 0 001.
in the expected direction. RELCORE × F was insignificant in the full sample but turns significant and negative when the core is relatively large. Mirroring these results, panel A in Table 9 shows that in the core business productivity regression, only the weighted forward complementarity coefficient WTDCF was significant and positive. Contrary to prior results, the weighted forward relatedness coefficient WTDF is negative and significant in this subsample. Panel A in Table 9 shows that when the core business was relatively large, three of the four weighted relatedness coefficients are significant and positive. These latter results are particularly important because, as noted earlier, the weighted coefficients in Table 6 capture the effects of relatedness with the core business, but not the effect of core business size. Taken together, these results confirm that the effects of relatedness are stronger when the core business is relatively large compared with segments rather than when it is small, as under these conditions its power and influence may also be higher. As a second robustness test, I examined the extent to which the attractiveness of the segment's industries had an effect on core business power. If segments are in industries that have profitable opportunities, then large size notwithstanding, the core may have less power over segments as greater resources are allocated to the latter. In the earlier regressions, SEGQ and WTDSEGQ were included to control for this effect; to explore this point further, I reran the regression in subsamples with WTDSEGQ (i.e., the weighted average industry Q of all segment industries) above and below the mean value of 1.6. Panel B in Tables 8 and 9 presents the results. Panel B in Table 8 shows that in the subsample where the WTDSEGQ was above the mean, none of the four interactions between RELCORE and F , B, CF, and CB was significant in the mixed effects model. Thus Hypothesis 1 was not supported in this subsample. In addition, panel B in Table 9 shows that the core productivity regression results were also weaker, with WTDCF becoming insignificant and WTDB and WTDCB remaining significant. Panel B in Tables 8 and 9 shows that in the subsample where WTDSEGQ was below the mean of 1.6, the results were similar to those in the full sample. The one exception is the weighted forward relatedness coefficient WTDF, which becomes negative and significant in the core business productivity regression, contrary to expectations. Overall, the results presented in panel B in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the effects of the core business are weaker when segments are in attractive industries, possibly because the segments are able to neutralize some of the power exerted by the core business under these conditions.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this research I have attempted to theoretically and empirically examine the costs associated with related diversification. Until this point, the literature has mainly recognized the benefits of related diversification, and an in-depth discussion of the costs has been relatively limited. My study adds to recent perspectives that have attempted to unpack these costs by highlighting how related diversification can be associated with lower performance resulting from a lack of adaptation (Rawley 2010) and increased complexity (Zhou 2011) .
In contrast with these perspectives, my analysis focuses on the power inequities that arise within the related diversified firm. Specifically, I argue that in these firms, the core business (in my analysis, the largest business) tends to enjoy greater power and influence because of its size (Rajan et al. 2000 , Wulf 2009 ) and by virtue of being a key provider of resources. This allows it to exert influence and constrain segments that are related in various internal and external transactions, thereby enabling it to shift productivity gains toward itself. These productivity shifts and the concomitant subsidization of the core business through these transactions are important costs experienced by related segments in diversified firms.
I provide the following evidence consistent with the above arguments. First, I show that a segment's productivity appears to suffer when it shares complementary forward and backward transactions with a relatively large core business. Second, I show that as a mirror image of the above findings, core business productivity is enhanced when it shares complementary forward and backward transactions and when it is backward integrated with segments. Finally, I show that the associated transfers of productivity do not seem to destroy value to the point that they fully offset the benefits of related diversification. The latter argument was supported by the finding that the two forms of productivity were either positively or insignificantly associated with each other. In addition, neither form of productivity had a negative impact on firm value after controlling for endogeneity and the relatedness of transactions between the core business and segments.
From a theoretical standpoint, one implication of my analysis is that related diversified firms are associated with cooperation problems that are unique to them as an organizational form. In related diversified firms, divisions are interconnected not just by financial transfers but also by product flows and resource transfers. The very sharing of activities along these multiple dimensions increases not only competition for scarce resources but also the potential for exercising power and influence activities, as some divisions extract value at the expense of others through these shared activities. In the past, strategy scholars have focused attention on the tradeoffs associated with related and unrelated diversification. With firms now increasingly pursuing related diversification, it is imperative that we develop a better understanding of the coordination and cooperation problems that arise specifically in these types of firms given that the sharing of activities is likely to amplify both of these problems.
In addition to highlighting the cooperation problems in related diversified firms, my study contributes to the literature in two other ways. First, in contrast with the traditional agency approach to diversification where it is argued that self-interested managers pursue unrelated diversification to increase size and hedge unemployment risks, I highlight that agency behavior can also arise in related diversified firms. Second, whereas the diversification discount literature argues that diversified firms can be inefficient because profitable businesses subsidize poorly performing divisions, I argue that these firms can also be inefficient because the core business is subsidized by smaller, related businesses.
In addition to the above implications and the empirical findings concerning the transfers of productivity from related segments to the core business, my study contributes to the literature on the dynamics that occur within diversified firms (Miller et al. 2007 ). For example, my analysis of the productivity of segments suggests that, on average, the sharing of transactions in my sample had an adverse effect, as indicated by the negative signs of the complementarity coefficients CF and CB in Table 5 . These negative coefficients confirm that significant coordination costs are imposed on segments in related diversified firms when transactions are shared, and they are consistent with the findings of some recent studies (e.g., Zhou 2011). Further, the findings also suggest that independent of relatedness, a dominant business can have an adverse effect on the productivity of segments, as suggested by the negative coefficient of RELCORE. This is consistent with the notion of a dominant coalition proposed by Cyert and March (1963) , and it also corroborates the effect of size on segment performance in diversified firms (Rajan et al. 2000) . In addition to size, my findings suggest that the basic attractiveness of external opportunities can have an important effect on internal dynamics and resource allocation. Thus, in my case, weighted average segment industry Tobin's Q had a positive impact on productivity, which suggests that segments in attractive industries may have been insulated from influence activities to some extent. More generally, these findings suggest that external opportunities may have an important impact on internal dynamics and the power wielded by a segment within the diversified firm. Another noteworthy result of my study is that the core business seems to be transferring productivity mainly through complementary external transactions rather than through transactions within the firm. This was evidenced by the fact the interaction terms RELCORE × CF and RELCORE × CB were negative and significant, whereas the terms RELCORE × F and RELCORE × B were insignificant in the segment productivity regressions. A tentative implication of this result is that power and influence activities may be more easy to contain in transactions that occur within the firm rather than outside the firm, because these internal transactions could be more easily observable and monitorable by headquarters. Nevertheless, even in these internal transactions, influence activities cannot be entirely eliminated because they are likely to occur through informal channels, rather than through formal communication.
The above implications with regard to the internal dynamics of related diversified firms were reinforced in the core productivity and firm value regressions. For example, in the core business productivity regression, core business size had a positive impact, indicating the effect of size on internal dynamics irrespective of relatedness. Similarly, core business industry Tobin's Q had a positive impact, suggesting that, once again, segments with strong external opportunities showed productivity gains and did not seem to be as vulnerable to power and influence activities by other segments. Interestingly, some of the relatedness coefficients had significant negative coefficients in the firm value regression, most notably the weighted CF and weighted CB coefficients. This indicates that external shared transactions have a stronger impact in increasing coordination and cooperation costs when compared with shared internal transactions. In sum, the findings of the empirical analyses suggest the following additional implications for the internal dynamics of related diversified firms: (a) that the size of the core business matters independent of relatedness in extracting productivity gains, (b) that industry opportunities are an important determinant of the power and influence exerted by a segment, and (c) that external transactions may be more prone to power and influence activities compared with internal transactions.
In the strategy literature, much of the work that has examined the performance effects of diversification has been at the firm level of analysis. As a result, although there have been rich qualitative accounts of the dynamics that occur within diversified firms, large-sample analyses and evidence pertaining to these dynamics have been lacking. Methodologically speaking, my study sheds light on some of these issues because it examines the business unit and the segment (McGahan and Porter 1997, Schoar 2002) 14 as the unit of analysis. Future research in the strategy literature could benefit from using such multilevel models with nested units of analysis to further understand the performance of diversified firms.
Future research could also build on my study in other ways. First, it would be useful to replicate my findings in alternative settings with finer-grained data. In my study I used input/output data to capture flows at the industry level. Alternative data sources that provide flows specifically at the business unit level within individual firms should be explored. Second, it would be interesting to examine whether the constraining effects exerted by the core business vary across firms; i.e., in some firms, do the interaction terms between RELCORE and F, B, CF, and CB become positive and significant in the segment-level regressions? In what kinds of firms would this occur? The answers to these questions would shed light on whether some firms have better capabilities in managing the power and influence activities between related businesses and the composition of these capabilities. A third direction to pursue would be the systematic exploration of whether the mechanisms related to productivity transfers and influence activities vary across different types of transactions. In my analysis the effects were stronger in external complementary transactions than in internal transactions. Future research could further explore this point to look for differential effects. Finally, it may also be instructive to examine whether the effects vary with the type of related segment; i.e., do related segments that have been acquired previously experience constraints that are different from related segments that have been built internally (Karim 2009 )? In sum, understanding the cost associated with related diversification is a fertile topic for future work in the strategy literature, and my study takes a step in that direction.
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Endnotes
1 Although I use the label "core business" throughout the paper, in theory, the arguments are developed chiefly from the perspective of the largest business of the firm. Thus the main drivers are the size of the segments with respect to the largest business and the relatedness of the segments with the largest business. My approach is similar to Rajan et al. (2000) and, more recently, Wulf (2009) , but it is distinct in the sense that it also considers relatedness. The distinction between "core business" and "largest business" is certainly important for some firms, but it may not be so in other instances. In my sample, for example, the largest business accounted for 64% of firm sales, indicating that it may well be the representative legacy business of the firm and a key part of its identity. For this reason, I use the label "core business" mainly as a matter of analytical convenience. 2 It is worth reiterating that the hypothesis pertains not only to the degree to which a segment shares forward/backward integration and forward/backward complementarity but also to the relative size of the core business with which it is sharing these transactions. A relatively small core business may not be able to exercise significant power over a segment despite relatedness. Thus both the size of the core business and relatedness are important in predicting productivity shifts. 3 While various methods exist for measuring productivity, my measure based on the asset turnover ratio has some distinct advantages. The accounting literature (e.g., Patatoukas 2012) widely documents that asset turnover ratio as a productivity measure is valued by various market participants. In addition, sales and assets information used to compute the ratio is difficult to distort when reporting in financial statements, which increases its reliability as a means to arrive at productivity. 4 In a telling example, Wulf (2009, footnote 4) discusses how the core business influenced decision making based on her experience in corporate planning and development in a Fortune 100 firm. She notes that the executive vice president of the core business often did not support new investment opportunities unless the new unit reported directly to him. She also notes that support from the core business manager was critical to the ongoing development and success of smaller businesses. This example suggests that the core business exerts influence not just through headquarters but also directly on other segments. 5 To illustrate these mechanisms, consider a steel firm and its related business, an auto bearings unit. The bearings unit may benefit from R&D and production knowledge accumulated in the steel business, such as knowledge pertaining to the mechanical properties of steel. The shared knowledge may also enable the steel business to better evaluate the opportunities of the bearings unit and provide appropriate funding, an internal capital market advantage enjoyed by the diversified firm. In return for these resources, the bearings unit may be forced to make price concessions to common customers such as automobile companies so that the core steel business can sell more cold rolled steel to these customers. Similarly, the bearings unit may be forced to buy steel from the core business despite the availability of better-quality steel from outside sources. Moreover, the bearings unit may also be constrained to buy capital equipment from the same suppliers as the steel business even though more specialized capital equipment suppliers may be available. These various factors would not be a consideration for a stand-alone bearings unit. 6 It is noteworthy that there are two independent and complementary explanations for why a segment may be less productive in a related diversified firm as opposed to when it is a stand-alone, single-business firm. The first is a short-term, transfer pricing argument in that the segment may be evidencing lower productivity as a result of lower revenues/higher costs due to transfer prices imposed by the core business within the diversified firm. The second argument is long term in that by being constrained to subsidize and transact with the core business, the segment may not develop the capabilities required to compete effectively in its business. 7 This is not to suggest that segment productivity will always be greater than the productivity of all single-business firms. The benchmark in this particular instance is the productivity of a single-business firm that the managers of the related segment would otherwise be able to put together and assemble with their knowledge and capabilities, without using any resources from a core business. 8 The model outlined is simplistic and is sketched mainly to flesh out the effects of productivity transfers from segments to the core business. For example, it is possible that by diversifying into related businesses, the core business may learn capabilities that provide it with benefits beyond just productivity transfers to the tune of C in (2). Alternatively, headquarters may sanction some productivity transfers from the segment to the core business to derive various long-term benefits. These benefits may arise, for example, in the form of continued support from external stakeholders and shareholders as the firm maintains legitimacy by supporting its legacy business. For simplicity, the model does not highlight these various aspects. 9 In addition, the Bryce-Winter index was constructed at the four-digit SIC code level, whereas core and segment SIC codes were sometimes reported at the three-digit level, and in rare cases, at the two-digit levels in Compustat. As a result, matching with the Bryce and Winter (2009) index caused considerable loss of observations in my sample. Fan and Lang (2000, p. 637 ) use a specifically constructed conversion table to match segment and input/output data even at these levels; this minimizes data loss. The conversion table also takes into account changes in the SIC system in 1987. 10 These weighted coefficients reflect relatedness at the firm level corresponding to F , C, CF, and CB. As an analogue to B, WTDB is the fraction of the total output of the core business industry consumed by the industries of the various segments, and so on. 11 Because this variable is partly endogenous and the information is also used to construct the dependent variable, I conducted my analysis with and without including it in the core productivity regression. My results remained the same. 12 Apart from obtaining various resources from the core business, this result may shed light on another reason why managers of a related segment may be willing to be part of a diversified firm despite being subject to influence and constraints by the core. If compensation and perks are tied to size, then managers of a segment may be better off within a diversified firm because the size of their units is larger than if they were in a stand-alone firm. 13 SFAS 14 requires firms to include intersegment transfers when they report their segment sales. Hence segment sales data reported in Compustat do not need to be adjusted for intersegment flows and can be used as is for calculating productivity. Nevertheless, to ensure that these transfers did not affect my results, I also conducted a robustness check after adjusting productivity for intersegment transfers. For example, I multiplied core business sales by (1 + WTDB) to adjust for output provided to segments and then reran the fixed effect regressions. Similarly for segments, I multiplied productivity by (1 + F ) to correct for output provided to the core business and reran the multilevel regressions. My results remain unchanged. I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 14 Interestingly, using combined plant-level and input/output data, Schoar (2002) concludes that internal transfers and transfer pricing do not systematically distort productivity in diversified firms. However, she does not consider other mechanisms where transfer pricing distortions may manifest, such as backward and forward complementarity.
